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THE NATION
Supreme Court
- Rodriguez o United States, No.
13-9972, slip op. (Apr. 21, 2015).
Without reasonable suspicion,
police cannot extend a traffic
stop to conduct a dog sniff.
After being issued a warning
for a traffic violation, Mr. Ro-
driguez refused to consent to
a dog sniff The police officer
then detained Mr. Rodriguez
for eight minutes until the dog
alerted the officer to drugs
in the vehicle, and the officer
found methamphetamine. The
Supreme Court held that the
extended stop was an unrea-
sonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito dissented.
- Heien . North Carolina, 135
S.Ct. 53o (2014). The Supreme
Court ruled that a mistake of
law could give rise to reason-
able suspicion. The Court held
that officers did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when they
conducted a traffic stop pursu-
ant to a mistaken interpretation
of the traffic laws. The Court
equated a reasonable mistake
of law with a reasonable mis-
take of fact to conclude that
a reasonable mistake of law
is not inconsistent with rea-
sonable suspicion. The Court
stressed the importance of im-
plementing an objectively rea-
sonable standard to prevent
willful ignorance of the law.
- Whitfield c United States, No.
13-9026, slip op. (Jan. i3, 2015).
The unanimous Court ruled
that, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
213(e), a bank robber forces an
individual to accompany him
when he forces that person to
go somewhere with him, even
if it is just a short distance.
The Court reasoned that the
severity of the penalty does
not require that the person is
moved a substantial distance
since the danger of forced
movement does not change
with the distance travelled.
- Grady v North Carolina, No.
14-493, slip op. (Mar. 3o, 2015).
In Grady . North Carolina,
Grady was convicted of tak-
ing indecent liberties with a
child. Following his sentence,
Grady was ordered to wear a
GPS bracelet as a penalty for
being a recidivist sex offend-
er. The Court ruled that this
constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment search, but remanded
for a determination on the
reasonableness of the search.
Circuit Courts
1s' Circuit
- United States . Gray, 780
E3d 458 (Ist Cir. 2015). Judge
Thompson penned a fun opin-
ion in United States . Gray.
Gray appealed her conviction
for "willfully and maliciously"
making a fake bomb threat
on a plane in violation of 49
U.S.C. § 46507(i). The First
Circuit found reversible error
in the lower court's definition
of malice, which required "evil
purpose or improper motive.
The Court of Appeals found
that improper motive low-
ers the burden of proof for
malice, and defined malice
as "evil purpose or motive."
- United States . Starks, 769
F.3d 83 (ist Cir. 2014). In anoth-
er Judge Thompson opinion,
the First Circuit ruled that an
unlicensed and unregistered
driver of a vehicle has stand-
ing to challenge the lawfulness
of a search. In United States v.
Starks, the district court denied
Starks' motion to suppress for
lack of standing. Starks was
driving his son's girlfriend's
rental car, but had no license.
The court remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing.
2 nd Circuit
- United States c Raymonda, 78o
F.3d io5 (2d Cir. 2015). Viewing
76 images of child pornogra-
phy over a period of seventeen
seconds does not, by itself,
show that a person deliberate-
ly or willfully accessed the im-
ages. Importantly, the evidence
established that the defendant
had not clicked on any thumb-
nails to view the full-size im-
ages. The Government needed
to show that the suspect was
an intentional collector be-
cause law enforcement sought
the warrant nine months af-
ter the images were accessed.
The Government meets this
burden when it establishes
that the person deliberately or
willfully accessed the images.
The warrant was not support-
ed by probable cause because
the Government failed to meet
its burden; however, the court
held that the evidence should
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not be suppressed because
the officer relied in good faith
on a magistrate's warrant.
3 rd Circuit
- Chacez-Alarez c. AG United
States, No. i4-i630o, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6189 (3d Cir. Apr.
16, 2015). The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) commit-
ted legal error when it held that
a general sentence of eighteen
months for committing five
crimes makes an alien deport-
able under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)
(A)(i)(II) (committing a crime
of moral turpitude for which
the sentence is one year or
longer makes an alien deport-
able). The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the
Government failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence
that any crime resulted in a
sentence of one year or more.
4 th Circuit
- Lee . Clarke, No. 1 3 -7914, 20i 5
U.S. App. LEXIS 4573 (4th Cir.
Mar. 20, 2o5). The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
sustained an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim. In Lee .
Clarke, the court held that De-
fendant's trial lawyer's failure
to request a jury instruction
for the definition of heat of
passion since there was ample
evidence that suggested heat
of passion. The court found
prejudice and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
5 th Circuit
- Trent( Wade, 7 76 F3d368 (5th
Cir. 201 5 ). In Trent v, Wade, the
Fifth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court had correctly denied
a police officer's claim of qual-
ified immunity arising from
the officer's entry into a home
without first knocking and an-
nouncing because the officer's
hot pursuit of a family mem-
ber was not a per se exception
to the knock and announce
requirement. The officer was
entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to his warrant-
less seizure of an ATV on the
premises because he did not
violate clearly established law.
6 th Circuit
- United States v. Winters, No.
13-6349, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
5143, (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 20i5). A
police officer had reasonable
suspicion to extend a traffic
stop four minutes to retrieve
his drug sniffing dog when
the driver displayed nervous
behavior, inconsistent and im-
plausible travel plans, and a
suspicious rental agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit distinguished
this case from the Supreme
Court Jardines opinion. The
court found that there was
a clear difference between a
dog sniff at a home, and a dog
sniff of a vehicle on the side of
the road. The court found that
the search was reasonable be-
cause the driver had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy.
7 th Circuit
- UnitedStates c. Grady, 746 F3d
846 (7th Cir. 2014). In United
States . Grady, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits' definition
of malicious in the context
of arson. There, the court de-
fined malicious as "[acting] in-
tentionally or with deliberate
disregard of the likelihood of
damage or injury will result."
8 th Circuit
- United States c Thurmond, No.
I4-1944, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
5932 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 201 5).
On appeal, Thurmond chal-
lenged the search warrant
that led to a number of crimi-
nal charges. Law enforcement
sought a search warrant two
days after the officers found
two leftover marijuana ciga-
rettes (roaches) in Thurmond's
trash. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found
that the two roaches, in ad-
dition to the suspects prior
criminal history, sufficiently
established probable cause.
9 th Circuit
- Doe e. Harris, 772 E3d 563
(9 th Cir. 2014). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district
court did not err in granting
appellees' motion to prelimi-
narily enjoin portions of the
Californians Against Sexual
Exploitation Act (CASE Act).
The CASE Act required all
sex offenders to provide law
enforcement written notice of
all internet identifiers within
24 hours. First, the court noted
that sex offenders who have
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completed their terms of pro-
bation and parole retain First
Amendment protections. Sec-
ond, the court found that the
CASE Act directly and exclu-
sively burdens speech, but
engaged in intermediate scru-
tiny because the CASE Act
is content neutral. The court
concluded that the CASE
Act unnecessarily chills pro-
tected speech in three ways:
(i) that the Act is ambiguous
as to what sex offenders are
required to report; (2) there
are insufficient safeguards to
prevent public access to the
information; and (3) the 24
hour reporting requirement
is onerous and overbroad.
1 0 th Circuit
- United States v. Wheeler, 776
F.3d 736 (loth Cir. 2015). Ex-
hortations to injure another
may constitute a true threat,
but there must be a subjec-
tive intent for the remarks
to be threatening. In United
States v. Wheeler, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed a defendant's
conviction where the district
court failed to instruct the jury
that the Government needed
to prove the defendant had
a subjective intent to make
threatening remarks. The court
rejected defense counsel's suf-
ficiency of the evidence argu-
ment. Defense counsel relied
on the theory that Wheeler's
"threats" instructed his reli-
gious followers to make at-
tacks, but Wheeler had no
religious followers. The court
found that a reasonable ju-
ror could consider Wheeler's
posts to be true threats, so it
remanded the case for a retrial.
1 1 th Circuit
- United States c Castor, No. 3-
13951, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
1682 (nth Cir. Feb. 3, 2015). In
United States v. Castor, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that
an officer violated the Fifth
Amendment when he assured
a suspect that he could not
charge him with additional
crimes if he confessed. The de-
fendant decided to waive his
right to remain silent as a result
of this deception.The evidence
was suppressed as fruit of a co-
erced confession because the
evidence could not have been
seized without the confession.
D.C. Circuit
- United States e Williams, 773
E3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The
Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld a
search stemming from of-
ficer's mistaken belief that
a driver was not wearing a
seatbelt. The court found that
there was probable cause for
the officer to believe that the
driver was violating a traf-
fic law, and that the mistake
was objectively reasonable.
Federal District Courts
Local Policy
- Washington 
. United States,
No. 3-CM-331, slip op. (D.C.
Mar. 19, 2015). The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals
ruled that the Marijuana De-
criminalization Amendment
does not apply retroactively.
The court relied on the gen-
eral savings statute and held
that because the act does not
expressly or implicitly state
or imply that its provisions
should apply retroactively.
Nationwide
Policies
- Civil Asset Forfeiture. At-
torney General Eric Holder
has curbed the government's
use of civil asset forfeiture laws.
State and local police may no
longer use federal law to seize
money or property without
warrants or criminal charges,
unless the federal authorities
were involved in the case. To
seize bank accounts, federal
prosecutors must now develop
clear evidence of a crime other
than structuring. A supervisor
must approve the action after
clear evidence is presented.
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